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The standard approach to modelling production under uncertainty has relied on
the concept of the stochastic production function. In the present paper, it is argued
that a state-contingent production model is more ﬂexible and realistic. The model




Risk and uncertainty are crucial features of agricultural production. Even
writers whose main concerns are with issues unrelated to agriculture, such
as the role of stock markets and the design of labour contracts, frequently
illustrate their analysis with agricultural examples, the most notable of which
is the occurrence or non-occurrence of rain (Diamond 1967).
Like all producers, agricultural producers are subject to uncertainty
regarding the demand for their products. Assuming competition in supply,
this demand uncertainty takes the form of price uncertainty. To a greater
extent than many others, agricultural producers must also deal with uncer-
tainty related to production. In Australia, the most important source of
uncertainty is the unpredictability of rainfall and, in particular, the occur-
rence of droughts.
The standard tool for modelling production uncertainty is the stochastic
production function, that is, a production function in which one or more
exogenous random variables enter as inputs. The stochastic production
function model of uncertainty has yielded a wide range of signiﬁcant
insights. Nevertheless, in a number of contributions over recent years, most
notably Chambers and Quiggin (2000), we have argued that the model is
insufﬁciently ﬂexible to capture a number of critical issues in relation to
producer behaviour under uncertainty.
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Most importantly, in the standard stochastic production function model
there is no state-contingent supply response. Producers can increase or
reduce their total productive effort and, in some cases, change their input
mix, but they cannot reallocate so as to substitute output in one state of
nature for output in another. By contrast, in standard multi-output models
of production under certainty, producers can allocate effort among differ-
ent outputs in response to technological shocks and changes in relative
input and output prices.
Arguably, an even more critical weakness of the stochastic production
function approach lies in the fact that it has not proved amenable to dia-
grammatic representation of the kind that remains the main source of intu-
ition for most economists. This lack of diagrammatic facility is typically
reﬂected in analyses that emphasise computation to the near exclusion of
intuition. Given that state-contingent production is, in essence, a special
case of multi-output production, it ought to admit the same diagrammatic
representation.
In the present paper, we will develop these points in detail. Our intent is
to show that the crucial issues regarding production under uncertainty can
be represented using the graphical representations familiar from standard
production theory and standard international trade theory. Viewed in this
light, the beneﬁts of risk reduction through insurance are simply a special
case of gains from trade. The analysis will be illustrated with reference to
the debate over drought policy and rainfall insurance in Australia, and the
related debate over crop insurance in the USA. Both topics have recently
been analysed in a general algebraic framework (Chambers and Quiggin 2004),
encompassing a broad range of ﬁnancial and technological instruments
for risk management. The graphical analysis presented here complements
the algebraic approach.
 
2. Debate over drought policy
 
Until 1992, the Australian approach to drought policy was centred on the
notion of ‘drought declaration’ of districts, normally at the discretion of
State governments. A variety of relief measures, which varied over time and
between states, was made available to farmers in ‘drought declared’ areas.
Examples included subsidies for the purchases of fodder, low-interest loans
and cash grants. The implicit policy model was that of an unpredictable
natural disaster, like an earthquake. Policy was focused on the provision of
assistance to farmers who had suffered, or who were exposed to, losses as a
result of drought.
This policy was criticised by economists including Freebairn (1983), who
argued that it undermined incentives to prepare appropriately for drought 
Drought policy analysis 227
 
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
 
and encouraged practices such as overstocking. Studies of the implementa-
tion of drought relief in the 1980s reinforced Freebairn’s arguments and
raised new concerns. Only a minority of eligible producers received any
relief. In Queensland, 36 per cent of the state had been drought declared
every one in three years, and over the period 1984–1985 to 1988–1989, 40





Economists also debated a range of market-based measures aimed at
providing a more coherent and less costly response to climatic uncertainty.
A natural starting point for the debate was the multiple-risk crop insurance
system then in use in the USA (Gardner and Kramer 1986). Most Australian
commentators saw this system, in which producers are reimbursed for yield
shortfalls arising from a range of climate events, as being even more exposed
to moral hazard problems than the Australian system of ad hoc relief. Atten-
tion was therefore focused on schemes where insurance payments were con-




 1984; Quiggin 1986) or yield in a given district (Industries Assistance
Commission 1978).
The main outcome of the Australian debate was the adoption of the
National Drought Policy in 1992. O’Meagher (2003) summarises the key
features of the policy. Its stated rationale is that ‘Drought is one of several
sources of uncertainty affecting farm businesses and is part of the farmer’s
normal operating environment. Its effects can be reduced through risk
management practices which take all situations into account, including
drought and commodity price downturns.’ The key policy implication is
that ‘farmers will have to assume greater responsibility for managing the
risks arising from climatic variability. This will require the integration of
ﬁnancial and business management with production and resource manage-





The application of a state-contingent approach to drought policy is a
natural one. As many writers have observed (Yaari 1969; Cochrane 2001),
the two-dimensional case state-contingent model lends itself naturally to a
diagrammatic representation, exactly analogous to that representing
choices between two commodities, or between consumption bundles at two
different dates.
The implications of this illustrative example for real-world problems
involving drought have never been properly developed. In the present
paper, these implications will be analysed in the context of a formal state-
contingent model. 
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 the unit vector with all entries equal to 1.
The formal structure may be considered as a two-period game between
the producer (with commitment on part of the producer) and Nature, with
periods denoted 0 and 1. In period 0, the producer commits ﬁxed inputs



















Chambers and Quiggin (2000) show that a state-contingent technology
may be summarised in terms of the input correspondence, which maps
state-contingent output vectors into sets of inputs that can produce that






Intuitively, one can think of this input correspondence as yielding all input
combinations that are on or above the production isoquant for the state-




. Moreover, upon imposing suitable curvature
conditions on the state-contingent technology, the lower boundary to this
set of inputs (the production isoquant) will have the familiar convex-to-the-
origin shape from standard microeconomic theory.
Conversely, we can consider an output correspondence
(2)
which, in a sense, is the inverse of the input correspondence. Intuitively, one
can think of it as giving the state-contingent output matrices that are on or
below a state-contingent transformation curve. In what follows, we routinely













 possible realisations of the output
corresponding to each state of Nature.
A farmer’s welfare depends only on his state-contingent consumption,




. In this model, consumption is equal to income
net of all ﬁnancial market transactions. For any given cost level, farmers seek to


























. For the moment we




 is monotone-increasing, quasi-concave and continuous.




, farmers are concerned with net returns, given by
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It is useful to introduce three analytical tools, the properties of which are






































Assuming an objective function of the general form W(y), producers will
seek to minimise costs for given output z, so that net returns, without loss
of generality, may be rewritten as
ys = pszs − c(w, z). (5)
The second is the beneﬁt function
B(y, w) = sup{b : W(y − b1) ≥ w}. (6)
The third and most important analytical tool is the idea of risk-substituting
and risk-complementary inputs. For any given output vector  , let the
associated input demand be
x(w, z) = arg min{wx : x ∈ X (z)}. (7)
Input n is said to be a risk-substitute at prices w if, whenever z′ is riskier
than z, xn(w, z′) ≤ xn(w, z), and a risk-complement if whenever z′ is riskier
than z, xn(w, z′) ≥ xn(w, z).
In models based on a stochastic production function technology, the
notion that input n is a risk-substitute might be intuitively rephrased by
saying that input n is risk-reducing, because there is a deterministic rela-
tionship between inputs and outputs. In the more general case modelled
here, input choices arise from cost minimisation at given factor prices. A
change in factor prices might change the risk-complementarity properties
of an input. For example, if risk arises from pest infestation, labour might
be a risk substitute when labour-intensive methods of pest control are optimal,
but might become a risk complement if, for example, the price of an easily
applied pesticide declines.
The deﬁnition of risk substitutes and risk complements proposed here
requires that we formalise the statement z′ is riskier than z. There are a great
many different ways in which the riskiness of vectors may be compared.
The simplest, analysed by Sandmo (1971) is that of a multiplicative spread
about the mean. A more general deﬁnition, widely used in the published
z   ∈ℜ+
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literature is that of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), also analysed by Hadar
and Russell (1969) and Hanoch and Levy (1969). The concept of monotone
spreads (also known as deterministic transformations) is intermediate
between these two and has proved tractable in comparative static analysis
(Meyer and Ormiston 1989; Quiggin 1991). For the case S = 2, and monotonic
vectors, all these deﬁnitions, and most others that have been considered in
the published literature, coincide. For the case S = 2, and assuming z1 ≤ z2
we, therefore, say z′ is riskier than z if
(8)
4. Diagrammatic representations
Most of the key issues in drought policy can be analysed in a very simple
version of the model, in which S = 2, M = 1. In this simple model, there are
two states of nature, with state 1 corresponding to ‘drought’ and state 2
corresponding to ‘normal’, a single input, and a single state-contingent output
in each state of nature. To permit graphical exposition, we will simplify further
by assuming for the moment that the input vector x is exogenously given.
Before considering the implications of the state-contingent production
model with a single output and S states of nature, it is useful to observe
that exactly the same representation is applicable for a standard production
problem with M = S outputs, or for an intertemporal production problem
with T = S time periods. In this section, we will develop the diagrammatic
representation of these three cases in turn, with M = T = S = 2.
4.1 Production, consumption and trade with two goods
For a standard two-output technology, and any given input level ≈, the set
Z(≈) may be represented diagrammatically by the familiar concave-to-the-
origin product transformation curve represented in ﬁgure 1(a). As in Ricardo’s
classic exposition of comparative advantage, the commodities are named
‘Cloth’ and ‘Wine’. Thus, the output of cloth and wine is represented by a
vector z ∈ℜ
2, where z1 denotes the output of wine and z2 the output of
cloth. Consistent with the notation set out for the state-contingent case we
will denote consumption by y ∈ ℜ
2  and assume that individuals seek to
maximise an objective function, W(y).
Consider ﬁrst the case of autarky, where there is a single representative
individual with no opportunities for trade. Hence, z = y. The optimal output
z
0, represented in ﬁgure 1(b), is the point of tangency between the indi-
vidual’s indifference curves (level sets of W) and the production possibility
set Z(≈).
′ ≤≤≤ ′ zzzz 112 2        .Drought policy analysis 231
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Figure 1 (a) Production possibility frontier; (b) optimal production and consumption without
trade; (c) optimal production and consumption with trade.232 J. Quiggin and R.G. Chambers
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Now suppose that trade is possible and assume, for simplicity that a small-
country assumption applies, so that the budget set is determined by a single
relative price ρ. We will take commodity 1, ‘Wine’, to be the numeraire.
Hence, given output z, the budget set is
Y(z) = {y : y1 + ρy2 ≤ z1 + ρz2} (9)
or, for a general price vector p,
Y(z) = {y : py ≤ pz}. (10)
As is illustrated in ﬁgure 1(c), the budget set through z is represented by
a line with slope −ρ. The optimal solution is to choose z* to maximise
pz = z1 + ρz2 (11)
and then to choose y to maximise W(y) subject to the budget constraint
py ≤ pz. Gains from trade may be measured, using the beneﬁt function, as
B(y, W(z
0)).
Note that the optimal output is independent of the preferences of the
representative individual and depends only on world prices. This ‘separa-
tion’ property is a standard feature of models with complete markets, that
is, models in which individual actors can trade all goods at prices which
they take to be exogenous. As drawn in ﬁgure 1(c), separation leads the
producer to specialise in cloth, but not completely. Conversely, we might
say that in the absence of trade, the production bundle is more diversiﬁed.
4.2 Intertemporal production, consumption and borrowing
Although Ricardo solved the problem of comparative advantage, he, like
all economists of the 19th century, had considerable difﬁculty with the con-
cept of interest, and the relationship between time and production. Fisher
(1930) was the ﬁrst to show that the problem of intertemporal production
and choice was not, in its essentials, any different from the standard pro-
duction–consumption problem solved by Ricardo.
In ﬁgure 2(a), the commodities ‘Cloth’ and ‘Wine’ have been replaced
with quantities of a single good (say, wheat) produced at two different
dates, Today and Tomorrow. The more wheat is saved as seed Today, the
less the ﬁnal output today and the greater the ﬁnal output Tomorrow. As in
the case of a two-good production technology, the opportunity for inter-
temporal substitution (producing less Today saves resources, which can be
devoted to producing more Tomorrow) gives rise to a transformation curve,Drought policy analysis 233
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Figure 2 (a) Production possibility frontier; (b) optimal production and consumption without
borrowing; (c) optimal production and consumption with borrowing.234 J. Quiggin and R.G. Chambers
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concave to the origin, representing the boundary of the production pos-
sibility set.
In the absence of opportunities for trade, z = y as before (ﬁgure 2b). The
tangency point z
0  might now be interpreted as the point of equality
between the marginal rates of substitution in intertemporal consumption
and production.
In the intertemporal setting, trade takes the form of borrowing and lend-
ing transactions. In ﬁgure 2(c), it is assumed that the individual can borrow
or lend as much as is desired at a rate of interest r, giving rise to a budget
line with slope −(1 + r). Thus, with period 1 consumption as numeraire, the
price of period 2 consumption is 1/(1 + r).
As in ﬁgure 1(c), the gain from the availability of borrowing and lending
presents the opportunities for gains from trade, measured from B(y, W(z
0)).
The gain from trade in this case is sometimes referred to as a dynamic
efﬁciency gain.
1 As the ﬁgures are drawn, the producer at the initial production–
consumption point in ﬁgure 2(b) might be thought of as having an invest-
ment opportunity that has a positive net present value at the interest rate r
but that is not attractive at the individual’s own, higher marginal discount rate.
The availability of borrowing allows the individual to undertake the invest-
ment while increasing consumption in period 1, as shown in ﬁgure 2(c).
4.3 Production under uncertainty and insurance
Fisher’s solution of the problem of intertemporal choice applied only under
certainty. The problem of choice under uncertainty remained a complex
mystery. The contributions of Keynes (1920) and Knight (1921), while
insightful, served more to complicate the issue than to resolve it. It was left
to Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1952, 1959) to point out that Fisher’s idea of
time-dated commodities could easily be extended to provide a tractable
model of production and choice under uncertainty. The idea is illustrated in
ﬁgure 3(a), where the axes are now labelled ‘Drought’ and ‘Rain’.
2 These
denote quantities of a given commodity produced in two different states of
nature.
1  Note that this usage of the term ‘dynamic efﬁciency’ relates to efﬁcient intertemporal
allocation of resources. It bears no relationship to the notion, commonplace in Australian
policy discussion, that exposure to competition will produce ‘dynamic efﬁciency gains’ dis-
tinct from those measured in standard static analysis based on comparative advantage. As
can be seen from a comparison of ﬁgures 1 and 2, the only difference between dynamic and
static efﬁciency gains relates to the kind of commodities that are under discussion.
2  Drought will normally be the less favourable state of nature. The precise meaning of
‘less favourable’ will be discussed in following text.Drought policy analysis 235
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Figure 3 (a) Production possibility frontier; (b) optimal production and consumption without
insurance; (c) optimal production and consumption with insurance.236 J. Quiggin and R.G. Chambers
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The transformation curve drawn there shows the combinations of state-
contingent outputs feasible for an exogenously given input level. It corre-
sponds to the boundary of Z(x) deﬁned earlier. For clarity’s sake, it is
important to emphasise that ﬁgure 3(a) is drawn holding ﬁxed the bundle
of inputs used by the producer. We do this for two reasons.
First, we want to emphasise the role that substitutability between state-
contingent outputs plays in producer decisionmaking under conditions of
production uncertainty. Models based on stochastic production functions
exclude substitutability between state-contingent outputs by assumption
(please see next section and ﬁgure 4(b) in particular).
Second, analysing state-contingent output–consumption choice, while
holding inputs ﬁxed, crystallises the intuitive connection between producer
decisionmaking under uncertainty and autarkic behaviour in traditional
Heckscher–Ohlin general-equilibrium models, which treat input endowments
as ﬁxed at the country level. It is easily seen, however, that the output equili-
bration processes described below must always pertain at the producer’s
optimal input choice. If they did not, then by simply reallocating state-
contingent outputs for a given input choice, the producer could always
improve welfare.
In the case of wheat production, inputs might be allocated between activ-
ities such as expanding the area under dryland cultivation, which will yield
an increased output in the presence of adequate rain, and expanding irriga-
tion, which will yield an increased output if there is no rain. Chambers and
Quiggin (2000) show how allocation of effort between activities, for each of
which state-contingent output is a linear function of effort, gives rise to a
production possibility set like that depicted in ﬁgure 3(a). The derivation is
identical in all important respects to the derivation of a production pos-
sibility frontier in the standard two-good, two-factor Heckscher–Ohlin
model in the absence of production externalities (jointness between the two
outputs).
The problem of production under uncertainty in the absence of ﬁnancial
markets is illustrated in ﬁgure 3(b). As before, y = z, so producers can only
consume what they have produced in any state of nature, just as, in the case
of autarky, a nation can only consume what it produces. The optimal
choice, represented on the diagram, is y = z
0.
We now consider the introduction of insurance. Recall again that output
prices have been normalised to unity. Suppose that an insurer is willing to
offer insurance against the occurrence of Drought. A standard way of rep-
resenting such a contract is to suppose that for each dollar of premiums,
the insured receives an indemnity i > 1 if Drought occurs. However, to see
the analogy with trade and with borrowing and lending, it is more useful to
think of the producer trading Rain state-contingent income for DroughtDrought policy analysis 237
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state-contingent income. For each dollar of Rain state-contingent income
paid in premiums, the producer receives a net payout of (i −  1) in the
Drought state. Hence, setting Drought state-contingent income as the
numeraire, the price of Rain state-contingent income is (i − 1). We illustrate
this in ﬁgure 3(c). Note that we assume that the producer can trade freely
at the relative price (i − 1) and can, if desired, take a position that yields a
positive payout in state 2. This means that the producer can ‘short’ the
insurance market and provide insurance to other producers if he or she
desires. However, with preferences as drawn, the producer insures against
Drought.
The existence of gains from trade is illustrated, as before, by the bene-
ﬁt function B(y, W(z
0)). Comparing ﬁgure 3(b) and 3(c), the availability
of drought insurance leads the producer to increase the value of output at
the state-contingent claim-price vector p = (1, i − 1) and also to optimise
consumption at these prices. Conversely, in the absence of insurance, the
producer engages in both self-protection, by choosing the more diversiﬁed
output z
0 rather than the more specialised z* and in self-insurance, by consuming
y = z
0 rather than the more diversiﬁed y*.
3 The concepts of self-protection and
self-insurance, ﬁrst analysed by Ehrlich and Becker (1972) are discussed in a
state-contingent setting by Quiggin (2002).
Notice, in particular, that the self-protecting and self-insuring activities
of producers in the absence of an insurance market leaves them at a posi-
tion that is exactly analogous to the autarkic solution in the production
and trade example considered in preceding text.
4.4 Stochastic production function
It might be thought that the state-contingent approach is a new and
unnecessarily complex alternative to analysis based on the simple idea of a
stochastic production function. The truth is quite the opposite. The state-
contingent approach predates, by two decades (early 1950s vs 1970s), the
representation of production uncertainty in terms of stochastic production
functions. More importantly, although superﬁcially simple, the stochastic
production function model, when viewed in state-contingent terms is a com-
plex and unnecessarily intractable special case of the general state-contingent
technology. So, in reality, the stochastic production is the newer and more
complicated alternative to the state-contingent approach.
This is scarcely surprising as exactly the same relationship holds for non-
stochastic production. The Arrow–Debreu approach based on production
3  Note that, as in standard portfolio theory, the adoption of a more diversiﬁed produc-
tion plan will lead to a less risky output vector.238 J. Quiggin and R.G. Chambers
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sets incorporates, as a special case, the approach based on production func-
tions. The important difference is that production economics discarded the
production function decades ago, because of its implausibility and intract-
ability, and replaced it with an axiomatic version of the Arrow–Debreu
approach.
4
The stochastic production function approach works most naturally with
a single output, related to input by a function of the form
z = f (x, ε) (12)
where ε ∈ℜ
S is a random variable such as rainfall. The idea is to take the stand-
ard production function model and extend it by allowing for a stochastic
input ε supplied by nature. In the case where there are only two states, that
is, two possible values for ε, the behaviour of the production function may
be illustrated by two curves as in ﬁgure 4(a).
For a given input x, the outputs
z1 = f (x, 1) (13)
z2 = f (x, 2) (14)
may be read off this graph. Allowing for free disposability, we may draw the
corresponding transformation curve as in ﬁgure 4(b). This rectangular
form  is immediately recognisable as the production possibility set for a
Leontief-in-outputs, or ﬁxed-output-proportions, technology. While useful
as a polar case, everywhere except in the published literature on production
uncertainty, this technology is viewed as analytically intractable (because of
its points of nondifferentiability) and unrealistic because it denies that pro-
ducers have the ability to substitute state-contingent outputs.
5. Similarities and differences
The exposition above shows that there are no fundamental analytical dif-
ferences between the standard model of production and consumption
4  Interestingly, this displacement took place at almost the same time that agricultural
economists began to focus on stochastic production functions. This bifurcation in the two
approaches has often led agricultural economists interested in production uncertainty to
question basic conceptual points long since settled elsewhere. A good example is given by
the debate over whether producers facing a stochastic technology minimise cost (Chambers
and Quiggin 1998). The conclusion to be drawn from the published literature based on the
stochastic production function is ‘apparently not’. The conclusion from the more general
state-contingent approach is ‘obviously and trivially yes’.Drought policy analysis 239
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under certainty, the Fisher model of intertemporal production and con-
sumption and the Arrow–Debreu model of state-contingent production. In
all three cases, the theory of optimisation is identical. In all three cases, the
Arrow–Debreu existence theorems and the ﬁrst and second welfare theorems
are valid. In all three cases, the concept of ‘gains from trade’ forms the basis
of the economic analysis of market transactions. And in all three cases, the
tools of convex analysis and duality theory are applicable.
There are, however, important differences. In some cases, these enhance
the power of economic analysis. The special characteristics of time and
uncertainty allow for additional structure that is not available for general
choice and production problems. For example, the fact that time ﬂows
sequentially allows, with some plausible assumptions about the associated
Figure 4 (a) Stochastic production function; (b) production possibility frontier for a stochastic
production function.240 J. Quiggin and R.G. Chambers
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preferences, the application of differential and difference equation methods
and the derivation of the associated Euler equations.
In the case of uncertainty, the concepts of subjective probability and
various forms of expected utility arise naturally from the structure of the
choice problem and from basic intuitions about relative likelihood. These
points are developed in detail in the next section.
There are also important features of the intertemporal and uncertainty
problems that limit the applicability of basic results, such as the funda-
mental welfare theorems. In the standard production model the assumption
that there exist competitive markets for each commodity seems a plausible
starting point for analysis. Violations of this assumption are commonly
described as ‘imperfections’ reﬂecting the intuition that, while important,
they represent modiﬁcations to reasonable prima facie assumptions about
the optimality of market outcomes.
By contrast, in intertemporal choice and even more in the case of uncer-
tainty, missing markets are the rule rather than the exception. Agricultural
producers, for example, can hedge against variations in output prices, but
output prices represent only a few of the many uncertain variables that
might affect the proﬁtability of agricultural enterprises.
In these circumstances, results derived under the assumption of complete
markets, as the results developed in preceding text have been, must be seen
as a polar case useful in analysis rather than as a starting point for a real-
istic assessment of policy issues. Policy analysis will almost invariably take
place in a second-best context where, for example, the creation of a new
market will not necessarily enhance welfare, as the number of missing mar-
kets is large.
A ﬁnal, more transitory, distinction between the economics of uncer-
tainty and the economics of certainty arises from the persistent impact of
analytical confusions regarding uncertainty, reﬂected, for example, in the
prevalence of stochastic production function models. Distinguishing the
signiﬁcant positive contributions made in the published literature on pro-
duction under uncertainty from the errors associated with inappropriate
approaches to modelling is a complex task that will take a long time to
complete.
6. Probabilities
The concept of probability plays a crucial role in most discussions of uncer-
tainty. Thus far, we have not made any use of probability concepts, focusing
on those aspects of the problem of production under uncertainty that are
also relevant for general multi-output production. Before considering prob-
ability, it is useful to focus on the notion of certainty. In ﬁgure 5(a), theDrought policy analysis 241
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production possibility diagram of ﬁgure 3(a) has been augmented by the
inclusion of a diagonal line through the origin, referred to by Chambers
and Quiggin (2000) as the ‘bisector’, as it bisects the positive quadrant and,
for that matter, the negative quadrant.
Points on the bisector, of the general form c1, satisfy z1 = z2 = c  and
therefore correspond to non-stochastic outputs. A crucial point observed by
Chambers and Quiggin (2000) is that, in the state-contingent model, output
uncertainty is the result of producer choices. Producers, if they choose, can
stabilise output completely, though they may incur (potentially very large)
costs in doing so. This is true even in the case of the stochastic production
Figure 5 (a) Stochastic and nonstochastic outputs; (b) fair odds.242 J. Quiggin and R.G. Chambers
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function. However, in this case, output stabilisation can be achieved only
by throwing away the ‘surplus’ output in all but the worst state of nature.
In ﬁgure 5(b), we consider the relationship between preferences and
probabilities. Drawing the indifference curve through z
0, and noting that, in
the absence of insurance, y
0 = z
0, we include a line tangential to the indiffer-
ence curve at the bisector. Suppose that the probabilities of the two states
are π1 and π2, with
π1 + π2 = 1 (15)
and that the individual is risk-averse in the sense that for any y
W(y) ≤ W(E(y)1S), (16)
where
E(y) = π π π π1y1 + π π π π2y2. (17)
Considering y on the marked indifference curve and close to the bisector, it
is easy to see that risk-aversion holds if and only if the slope of the tangent
line is −π1/π2  at  every point on the bisector.
5  A line with this slope is
referred to as a ‘fair-odds line’.
Moreover, consideration of the intersection between the indifference curve
and the bisector gives rise to a natural canonical representation of preferences
under uncertainty. For any y, the certainty equivalent e(y) is deﬁned as:
e(y) = min{t : W(t1S) ≥ W(y)}. (18)
The risk premium is given by
ρ(y) = E(y) − e(y), (19)
and risk-aversion is equivalent to the requirement that ρ(y) ≥ 0, for all y.
The risk premium is illustrated as the (vertical or horizontal) distance from
E(y), given by the intersection with the bisector of the fair-odds line
through y, to e(y), given by the intersection with the bisector of the indif-
ference curve through y.
5  The precise statement of this result depends on the assumption that W is differentiable
in a neighbourhood of the bisector. In the absence of differentiability, the tangent must be
replaced by a subdifferential, allowing for risk-aversion with respect to multiple probability
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Next, consider the fair-odds line through z
0 in ﬁgure 5(b). As output is
shifted from Rain to Drought, the fair-odds line cuts the production pos-
sibility curve from below. By convexity, the same is true at any point on the
production possibility curve between z
0 and the bisector. That is, if state-
contingent outputs are initially equal, a reallocation of effort from Drought
state-contingent output to Rain state-contingent output will result in an
increase in expected output. In this sense, the Rain state is the more favor-
able state of nature. A producer concerned to maximise expected output
must produce more in the Rain state than in the Drought state.
7. Drought policy
Drought policies can be divided into three classes: (i) drought relief
policies designed to offset losses incurred by farmers as a result of drought;
(ii) insurance, including multiple-risk and area-yield crop insurance pro-
grams of the kind operated in the USA (Chambers and Quiggin 2002) and
rainfall insurance programs, such as those discussed by Bardsley (1984) and
Quiggin (1986); and (iii) consumption smoothing policies aimed at enabling
farmers to smooth their consumption over drought and non-drought states
of nature through saving and borrowing.
The idea of drought relief is simple. Farmers who have incurred losses
as a result of drought receive partial compensation from government. A
drought-relief program might be modelled as a state-contingent payment
qs(x, zs) such that qs ≥ 0 if s is a drought state and qs ≤ 0 if s is not a drought
state. The payment qs is normally increasing in inputs x and decreasing in
output zs.
The idea that drought relief can involve negative payments qs < 0 in non-
drought states might seem inconsistent with observed experience. Histor-
ically, various kinds of assistance to farmers have been justiﬁed as ‘tariff
compensation’ or as part of a system of ‘protection all round’. In this view,
payments to farmers in drought conditions might be seen as compensation
for negative rates of effective protection for farmers that lead to the extrac-
tion of rent from farmers under normal conditions.
Much of the analysis of drought relief also applies to multiple-risk and
area-yield crop insurance of the type that has prevailed in the USA. The
two main differences are that payments are not conditional on the occur-
rence of a particular state of nature and that participation is voluntary and
requires payment of a premium. Voluntary participation implies the exist-
ence of an adverse selection problem as discussed by Just et al. (1999). The
payment of a premium might involve some wealth effects. These issues will
not be addressed in the present paper. Conditional on participation, and
assuming wealth effects are not important, the producer’s problem in the244 J. Quiggin and R.G. Chambers
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presence of multiple-risk crop insurance is similar to that in the presence of
drought relief programs.
Drought insurance schemes involve a payment to the producer qs that is
purely state-contingent, such that qs ≥ 0 if s is a drought state and qs ≤ 0 if
s  is not a drought state. An actuarially fair drought insurance scheme
involves a payment qs satisfying
(20)
Schemes designed to facilitate consumption smoothing have many of the
same characteristics as drought insurance schemes. In particular, consider
an idealised consumption-smoothing scheme in which farmers can deposit
into and withdraw or borrow from a ‘buffer fund’, subject only to a require-
ment of long-run solvency that, for each farmer, average deposits should
equal average withdrawals. Suppose farmers follow a ﬁxed policy, in which
the amount of the deposit or withdrawal qs, depends only on the state of
nature s. Then the average solvency requirement is that
(21)
which is the same as (20). To distinguish between the models of choice
under uncertainty over time, it is necessary to impose more structure than
is present in the model presented here.
For the case S = 2, q1 = i − 1, q2 = −1, and actuarial fairness requires
. (22)
Equivalently, the insurer’s expected proﬁt, at the probabilities (π1, π2) is
1 − iπ1 = 0. (23)
8. Effects of drought policy
We are now ready to consider the resource allocation and welfare effects of
a range of polices that might be considered as a response to drought. A large
class of such policies may be represented by output–payment plans (z, y).
We assume that government is risk-neutral. Hence, any ﬁrst-best alloca-
tion must involve the production of the risk-neutral optimal output, that is,
the solution z
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and the receipt by farmers of a non-stochastic income vector of the form
y
FB1S = E[z], where
(25)





We will assume that the ﬁrst-best solution involves a Pareto improvement
on the self-insurance solution. That is, assume that y
FB  ≥  e(y
0) so that
farmers are better off, and that y
FB ≤ E[z
FB] so that the government has a
non-negative expected return.
6 The question of the precise distribution of
gains is not crucial to the analysis. To avoid wealth effects, and simplify the
diagrammatic exposition, we will assume that producer preferences display
constant absolute risk aversion and that the ﬁrst-best solution is that
derived from actuarially fair insurance, so that y
FB = E[z
FB].
In general terms, we expect that the ﬁrst-best solution (z
FB, y
FB1S) will
involve a riskier output plan than the solution (z
0, y
0 = z
0) chosen by a risk-
averse producer. Note that, by deﬁnition E[z
FB] − c(w, z
FB) ≥ E[z] − c(w, z)
for any feasible z ≠ z
FB, including z
0. For the case S = 2, we can make this
more precise. Let the plan (z
FB, y







That is, returns net of costs are lower in the bad state and higher in the
good state for the ﬁrst-best solution than for that chosen by a risk-averse
producer, as shown in ﬁgure 6(a). Having access to fair insurance, the pro-
ducer does not need to engage in costly self-insurance.
It remains to examine the welfare effects of alternative drought policies
relative to the ﬁrst-best. For simplicity, we will focus on the case where poli-
cies completely stabilise net farm income, as in the ﬁrst-best, assuming
optimal production responses. It is straightforward to show that, under the
assumptions stated above, drought insurance that completely stabilises
income will lead to a Pareto-optimal outcome. Choose (q1, q2) such that
(28)
6  This means that the market is ‘insurable’ in the sense used by Chambers (1989). More
simply, there are potential gains from trade.
zz w z
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Figure 6 (a) Optimal production and consumption with fair insurance; (b) optimal production
and consumption with unfair insurance; (c) drought relief and moral hazard.Drought policy analysis 247
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Then the consumption vector y = z
FB, obtained by producing the ﬁrst-
best output, is a non-stochastic vector of the form y
FB1S, where
(29)
Now consider any z′ ≠ z
FB. Two possible cases arise. If y′ = z′ + q is non-
stochastic, it is equal to y′1S for some y′ ≤ y
FB, and is therefore statewise
dominated by y
FB1S. If y′ is stochastic it is riskier than the non-stochastic
y
FB1S and has a lower mean. Hence, all risk-averse decision makers will
prefer y
FB1S.
This point may be illustrated by consideration of ﬁgure 6(a). Because the
fair-odds line is tangent to the production possibility frontier at z
FB, it lies
above the fair-odds line through any other z. Risk aversion implies that the
most preferred point on the fair-odds line is y
FB1S.
Figure 6(b) shows the case where drought insurance is offered at actuari-
ally unfair prices. The insurance line is steeper than under actuarially fair
insurance, implying that
(30)
As a result, the optimal output z
SB is less risky and has a lower mean
than the ﬁrst-best z
FB. Moreover, full insurance is no longer optimal. The
preferred consumption vector y
SB leaves the producer bearing some risk.
7
Finally, in ﬁgure 6(c), we consider the implications of drought relief,
modelled as an ex post payment with the property
q1(z) − q2 = z2 − z1, (31)
so that income is completely stabilised. Note that, unlike the case of
drought insurance, the payment made in the ‘drought state’ depends on the
producer’s choice of state-contingent output z. The effect of drought relief
is that the producer can pick the ‘rain’ output z2, receiving net income
z2 − q2, and is guaranteed the same net income if a drought occurs. In these
circumstances, there is no incentive to allocate any resources to preparation
for drought.
7  The optimality of partial insurance depends on the assumption of smooth preferences,
which is implicit in the way the ﬁgure has been drawn.
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8.1 Drought policy and input choices
To permit a complete analysis, we drop the simplifying assumption that we
have been maintaining since our discussion of ﬁgure 3(a, b) that input levels
are ﬁxed,
8 and now brieﬂy consider equilibrium input choices. However, we
retain the simplifying assumption of a single output commodity M = 1, with
non-stochastic price normalised to 1, and focus on the case S = 2.
Consider a choice between two input vectors x
0 and x′, and assume, for
simplicity, that wx
0 = wx′. As shown in ﬁgure 7, each gives rise to a sepa-
rate output set, Z(x
0) and Z(x′) respectively, each with its own production
possibility frontier. For any given set of state-contingent prices, the optimal
output z
0, conditional on inputs x
0, is riskier than the optimal output z′,
conditional on inputs x′. This implies, that x
0 contains a higher level of
risk-complementary inputs and a lower level of risk-substituting inputs
than x′.
Now consider the insurance lines through z
0  and  z′, corresponding
respectively to actuarially fair insurance and to unfair insurance with −q2/
q1 ≥ π1/π2. With actuarially fair insurance the more risk-complementary
input vector x
0  yields a higher return, but the reverse is true for unfair
insurance. Thus, under unfair insurance the producer will engage in ‘self-
protection’ through the choice of a risk-substituting input bundle.
8  As pointed out earlier, this is tantamount to examining optimal state-contingent out-
put choices given optimally chosen input levels.
Figure 7 Endogenous input choices.Drought policy analysis 249
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Conversely, if the effect of drought policy is to provide subsidised insurance,
the preferred input bundle will be one that is more risk-complementary
than the cost-minimising ﬁrst-best choice. As critics of Australian drought
policy have long pointed out, the provision of ex  post  relief based on
observed losses penalises producers who have engaged in prudent and efﬁ-
cient self-protection.
The extreme case is that of the drought relief policy considerered above,
in which producers receive a payment z2 − z1. In effect, the insurance line is
horizontal. For any given level of input cost, the optimal state-contingent
production vector is that which maximises z2. Since this output is riskier
than the ﬁrst-best, it will be associated with higher use of risk-complementary
inputs and lower use of risk-substituting inputs.
9. Concluding comments
The idea that production and choice under uncertainty can be represented
in terms of commodities contingent on the occurrence of a state of nature
is an old one. It traces back to the pioneering general equilibrium models
of Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1952). Arrow and Debreu used convex ana-
lysis to demonstrate the existence and Pareto-optimality of equilibrium, but
neither they nor subsequent writers in the published general equilibrium
literature presented much analysis of comparative statics and similar issues
of concern to policy economists. At about the same time, Shephard (1953)
was developing the ﬁrst systematic applications of duality theory in eco-
nomics. It has taken nearly ﬁfty years for these two streams of thought to
merge. Chambers and Quiggin (2000) give the ﬁrst systematic application
of modern tools of convex analysis and duality theory to the problems of
production and choice under uncertainty.
A noteworthy feature of the analysis presented in Chambers and Quiggin
(2000) is that the expected-utility hypothesis is not required, except as an
illustrative special case. At this point, we call the reader’s attention to the
fact that we have nowhere invoked the expected-utility hypothesis in our
discussion. Thus, the same is true of the graphical analysis presented in the
present paper. In some particular applications, the additive functional form
associated with the expected-utility model proves useful as a simplifying
assumption, but for most purposes the assumption of risk-aversion is sufﬁ-
cient to permit a simple and informative analysis.
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